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Ludington: Welcome, everybody. Thanks for joining us this
morning. We've got a great topic on deck here and a fantastic panel.
Heller was decided ten years ago.' Since then, there have been some 1,100
cases decided in the lower federal courts about the validity or non-validity
of gun control laws. So those lower court cases are our topic for the
morning; particularly seeing how Heller has been applied, debating
whether the lower courts are doing it justice, and whether they are honoring
the intent and the language of the Heller opinion itself.
So we've got a fantastic panel. We have Brannon Denning, who is the
associate dean and a professor of law at Cumberland School of Law,
Samford University. Dennis Henigan, former vice president of the Brady
Center and current director of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids. David
Kopel, who is the research director at the Independence Institute, and an
associate policy analyst at the Cato Institute, also an adjunct professor of
law at Denver University, Sturm College of Law. And on the end, Hannah
Shearer, staff attorney and Second Amendment litigation director at the
Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence.
* Panelists made edits to this transcript. Visit www.campbelllawreview.com to view the full
video of Campbell Law Review's 2018 symposium: HellerAfter Ten Years.
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1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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Now, I've introduced them in order from Professor Denning down to
Hannah Shearer, but Ms. Shearer is actually going to kick us off, and she
will give us a fifteen- to twenty-minute presentation followed by Professor
Kopel, Mr. Henigan, and ending with Mr. Denning. So, Hannah?
Shearer: Thanks so much to Professor Ludington and to the students
and faculty at Campbell Law School. I'm really thrilled to be here. And
thanks also to my fellow panelists. It's really great to hear from so many
experts in this field. I'm going to start off a little bit about my background
and then dive right into our topic.
So I am the Second Amendment litigation director at Giffords Law
Center to Prevent Gun Violence. We're based in San Francisco. And one
thing I luckily know quite a bit about is Heller in the lower courts, because
part of the work that I oversee at Giffords is that we actually track and
analyze all Second Amendment lawsuits that are filed and decisions that
are rendered on a Second Amendment claim, and we've been doing that
since Heller came down in 2008. So that means that I am at least partly
responsible for that statistic you just heard, which is that there have been
over a thousand Second Amendment claims decided since Heller. And
actually, according to the metrics that we use, in 93% of those cases since
Heller, the court has-the lower court usually-has rejected the Second
Amendment claim at issue. As you know, the Supreme Court since Heller
has only granted review in McDonald,2 the case that held that the Second
Amendment was applicable to states, and in another narrow case, where
they just reiterated the holding of Heller and instructed a lower court to
apply it in a case called Caetano.
So for my remarks today, I want to spend a little bit of time with
Heller, and then I'll talk about a few key trends in the lower court decisions
since Heller. And for each of those trends that I'll talk about, I'll argue my
position, which is that the courts applying Heller and considering a Second
Amendment challenge since then haven't been ignoring the decision.
They've been honoring it. And the reason that's true is because the Heller
decision was by no means any sort of conclusion, or end of the road, when
it comes to Second Amendment litigation, or even the historical debates
over what the Second Amendment does and doesn't cover. Rather, Heller
announced the beginning of a really involved task of figuring out what the
Second Amendment means for many different types of gun laws.
Heller addressed whether a total ban on keeping an operable handgun
in the home for self-defense violated the Second Amendment. And that's a
2. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
3. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016).
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narrow premise that the court considered and ruled on. The plaintiff was
seeking to keep and carry a functioning handgun in his home for purposes
of self-defense and was barred from doing so by a really restrictive D.C.
law. The Heller court, in fact, opined that few laws in the history of our
nation have come close to the severe restriction of the district's handgun
ban.
So, in Heller, the court struck down this uniquely severe handgun ban,
noting that its historical analysis shows that keeping a handgun in the home
for self-defense is a quintessentially lawful purpose for possessing firearms
under the Second Amendment. So the court reasoned that the handgun ban
would fail constitutional muster under any of the standards that are applied
to evaluate enumerated constitutional rights, like strict scrutiny or
intermediate scrutiny.
So that's what Heller did, but leading up to that holding, the court
provided a lot of limiting, qualifying language describing regulations that
the opinion was not intended to cast doubt on. I'll try to summarize that
quickly because I think this will be discussed by others. The court
cautioned that, like other rights, the Second Amendment right is not
unlimited. It's not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever for
any purpose.
And, as an example of the Second Amendment not being unlimited,
the court pointed to the example of concealed carry prohibitions, which it
said had been upheld by the majority of nineteenth-century courts to
consider that type of law. That's a pretty extreme restriction that doesn't
really exist today: a complete prohibition on public concealed carry of
So then the court identified a non-exhaustive list of
firearms.
presumptively lawful types of regulatory measures that would survive the
Heller decision, or that Heller wasn't intended to cast doubt upon.
To further emphasize just these kind of limiters to its decision, and
that the permissible regulations the court identified weren't exhaustive,
Justice Scalia wrote, "[S]ince this case represents this Court's first in-depth
examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify
the entire field . . . ." In reality, that's not a decision that clarified much of

the field for lower courts. The decision identified a nearly wide-open field.
It raised a lot of new questions for litigants, and for advocates, and for
policymakers, and judges. And I think the language in Heller that I cited
isn't an invitation for courts to strike down many more gun laws after
Heller, but it's more of an invitation for governments to continue defending
some of their existing gun laws; laws in the areas that Heller identified as
being an example of the Second Amendment not being unlimited.
So following Heller, governments took that invitation to vigorously
defend their gun laws, and litigants took the rest of Heller as an invitation
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to bring more Second Amendment challenges, and to really try to get to
some of the field that the court opened up to litigation, but didn't clarify or
decide. And so I want to talk about just a couple key trends that have
emerged in lower court litigation over Second Amendment claims. There
are a lot that I could speak about, but the ones I want to mention are some
significant methodological choices that lower courts made when they were
faced with the task of how to adjudicate a Second Amendment challenge
where the challenged law isn't the same as Heller's unusually extreme ban
on keeping handguns in the home. And so one of the significant
methodological choices that lower courts made was to apply something
called the "two-step approach" to Second Amendment challenges.
And the other one I'll talk about is the choice generally to apply
intermediate constitutional scrutiny to Second Amendment claims. And
both of these have achieved a critical level of acceptance among lower
courts. It's a near consensus among the circuit courts.
I'll begin with the two-step approach. So that inquiry, which, as I
mentioned, it's-and nearly all the federal circuits have adopted thisFirst, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and the
D.C. Circuits have all applied a version of this test. And it asks at "step
one" of considering a Second Amendment challenge, Does the law being
challenged, the firearm law, burden conduct that's actually protected by the
Second Amendment?
Or does it fall outside of the scope of the
amendment, given Heller's recognition that this isn't a completely
unlimited right?
And so if the answer is that the law doesn't burden Second
Amendment protected conduct, courts that apply the two-step approach
stop there and they uphold the law. If a court finds a regulation does
implicate protected conduct, it moves on to step two, which is to identify a
level of constitutional scrutiny to apply to the claim, much like the tiers of
scrutiny that are selected and applied in the First Amendment context.
Some people have critiqued the two-step approach, but I think that it
comes from Heller. Really, it comes from Heller's choice to strike down
an unusually severe law prohibiting keeping operable handguns in the
home completely, while also announcing a vision of the Second
Amendment in which there is still flexibility to regulate firearms in a
number of specific areas that the court enumerated. But also, in areas
beyond that, that the court said were still permissible to regulate, but
weren't actually listed in its non-exhaustive list of presumptively lawful
gun regulations after Heller.
So with that in mind-oh, and the other thing is that the Heller
majority didn't announce a level of scrutiny that it would apply to the
handgun ban it was analyzing. Instead, the court held that the law wouldn't
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pass constitutional muster under any of the applicable tiers of scrutiny. But
that isn't to say that in a challenge involving a more modest type of gun
regulation that it wouldn't be appropriate to apply the traditional levels of
scrutiny that are applied when evaluating challenges involving other
constitutional rights.
So moving on to the next trend I wanted to talk about, which is that
many courts have applied this two-step approach that I laid out, and then, at
step two, when they're considering a gun regulation that burdens the
Second Amendment but doesn't go so far as to completely prohibit keeping
an operable handgun in the home. Courts have reached a near-consensus to
apply intermediate constitutional scrutiny as opposed to strict scrutiny.
This isn't completely uniform. There are some courts that are different.
The Seventh Circuit has sometimes advocated for something in
between intermediate scrutiny and strict. And you know, this does still get
debated among Second Amendments litigants, but in general, most of the
circuits have applied intermediate scrutiny in sort of like a run-of-the-mill
challenge to a gun regulation that is more modest than what was at issue in
Heller-significantly more modest.
This approach is consistent with Heller because it's consistent with
Heller's articulation of the right of the Second Amendment: that it's not a
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever, in any manner whatsoever,
and for whatever purpose. Many courts have rightly interpreted this
language to mean that there are some gun regulations that are going to be
subject to intermediate scrutiny because they're not a severe intrusion onto
people's core rights under the Second Amendment. They're more modest
regulations in the areas that Heller acknowledged could persist after the
decision. And so, in that respect, they're more like a time, place, and
manner restriction under the First Amendment, which is subject to
intermediate scrutiny as opposed to strict scrutiny.
In closing, Heller acknowledged that the Constitution leaves a variety
of tools for combating the problem of handgun violence, including some
measures regulating handguns. And then later, McDonald recognized that
state and local experimentation with reasonable firearm regulations will
And so I think that the
continue under the Second Amendment.
methodological approaches I've described in the lower courts are
appropriate to ensure that the government can continue to regulate firearms
to combat gun violence while staying within the constitutional limits that
Heller outlined.
Thanks so much.
[APPLAUSE]
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Kopel:
Well, I'd like to follow up on what Ms. Shearer said. At
the level of generality that she spoke about, I think she was exactly
accurate, and if this is on the bar exam, you can take her words verbatim,
and apply them, and you will get the answer correct. I'd like to follow up
and flesh out some of the details of what she accurately says is the
approach that most courts have adopted post-Heller; so I'm going to just go
through the rules.
The purposes of the Second Amendment, as the court understands
them-the lower federal courts in post-Heller cases-is that, of course,
self-defense is at the core of the Second Amendment right, but the right is
not limited only to self-defense. It also includes hunting, target shooting,
of course the militia, which is in the text, and all other lawful purposes. In
terms of what arms are protected, at least the starting premise is, straight
from Heller, common arms that are typically possessed by law-abiding
citizens: handguns, rifles, shotguns, knives, defensive sprays, stun guns,
things like that. And things that are not protected are arms that are, from
Heller, "dangerous and unusual." It's a conjunctive test. You have to be
dangerous and unusual.
Now all weapons are dangerous by definition, so to be so dangerous
that you're outside the Second Amendment protection, at the least, has to
mean that the arm is more dangerous than a handgun, which, as Dennis can
tell you from his long career, those can be quite dangerous things. Some of
the things that have been held to be outside the scope of Second
Amendment rights-being "dangerous and unusual" rather than common,
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes-grenades,
machine guns, pipe bombs-are not Second Amendment arms.
The two-step test that has been adopted by eight of the federal circuits
was created by the Third Circuit in United States v. Marzzarella.4 The test
has been affirmatively rejected in the First Circuit, which focuses more on
text, history, tradition, and precedent. Although, of course, those factors
are certainly important in the two-step test as well, at least when properly
applied. Likewise, the Eighth Circuit has not, at this point, adopted the
two-step test.
Like much Second Amendment jurisprudence in the post-Heller era,
the two-step test is methodologically borrowed from the First Amendment.
If you have a free speech case, the first thing the court has to do is say,
"Well, do we actually have a free speech case?" So some students at a
public school are wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War, and
then the school punishes them for doing that.

4. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).
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The first question is, well, is this a free speech issue at all? After all,
they didn't say anything. They were just dressing up with this clothing.
Some people would say, "Well, that's got nothing to do with speech. No
words going on here." But the Supreme Court, correctly, in Tinker v. Des
Moines School District, said this is a free speech issue because these black
armbands have communicative content.5
Conversely, on the other side, somebody says, "We have a wiretap,
and you hear some people conspiring to commit bank fraud, and then they
get prosecuted for that." They say, "How can you prosecute me for that?
All we were doing was talking. And that's speech, and the First
Amendment says, 'Congress shall make no law'-what part of 'no law'
don't you understand?" The court will say, "No, actually, you've got no
free speech claim in here at all, even though you're being punished solely
for the words you said, because conspiring to commit bank fraud is not part
of the First Amendment right." Obviously, likewise, using a gun in a
violent crime is not part of the Second Amendment right.
So at this step one, the court says, "Is this even a Second Amendment
case? We know the plaintiff claimed it was in the pleadings, but is it really
a Second Amendment case?" So in step one, the government can win at
that stage if the government carries its burden of proof; of proving that
whatever this case is about is outside the scope of the right to keep and bear
arms as it was traditionally and historically understood. Particularly in
1791, when the Second Amendment was ratified, and then in 1868, when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified for, among other purposes, making
the Second Amendment enforceable against the states.
If the government fails to carry its burden of proof at step one-to
prove that it's not really a Second Amendment case-then the case goes on
to step two, where the court, will apply some level of heightened scrutiny.
What kind it is, is up in the air. In a Second Amendment case, there areat step one, there are some easy things to see. You disarm an enemy
soldier on the battlefield. "You took away my guns. What could be more
of a Second Amendment violation than that?" says the enemy soldier. And
the answer is, "No, actually the Second Amendment does not apply to
A case called Johnson v.
enemy combatants on the battlefield."
Eisentragerfrom 1950 by Justice Jackson made that point. 6
But there can be harder things. What about aliens who are unlawfully
present in the United States? Does the Second Amendment apply to them?
Some courts say, "No, not at all. Look at how Heller said, 'Law-abiding
citizens,' over and over and over." And other courts have said, "Well,
5. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
6. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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maybe it does apply to them, particularly if they have longstanding ties to
the United States; after all, the Second Amendment text is about the people
and not the citizens." This is based on the implications of a 1989 U.S.
Supreme Court case, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, where the court
said, "No, the Fourth Amendment doesn't apply to a Mexican in Mexico,"
but "the people" has some sort of broad meaning of a people who have
some affiliation with the United States.
In step one, the courts all look strongly at Heller's tripartite set of
examples of presumptively lawful gun controls: prohibiting gun possession
by felons and the mentally ill; forbidding carry in sensitive places, such as
schools and government buildings; and third, allowing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Of course, each one of these
is an exception that reinforces the rule. You can prohibit guns for some
people, but that's an exception to the rule that, generally, law-abiding
citizens have a right to possess arms.
Allowing laws forbidding concealed carry at all or in some sensitive
places, are exceptions to the general right that there is a right to carry arms.
Likewise, the conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms
are legitimate limitations on the general right of firearms commerce. Of
course, there has to be a right of firearms commerce by implication,
because otherwise, the right to keep and bear arms could hardly exist. Just
as the courts have unanimously said there's a right to ammunition. You
can't say, "Well, oh, we're not going to ban any guns at all. You can buy
guns, cash and carry, no background checks at all. We just outlaw
ammunition." The courts would not allow that.
The question for the courts has been what these things I just
mentioned, that were called "presumptively lawful," is whether these are
normal presumptions; in normal law, a presumption can be rebutted. It's
the starting point, but you can come in with sufficient evidence to
overcome that.
So, for example, even though bans on felons are presumptively lawful,
can a person overcome that by showing that he or she, as a convicted felon,
is actually not in the slightest bit any more dangerous than anyone else?
They were convicted of marijuana possession in 1971, which was a felony
at the time, but since then, they've never gotten in trouble. They could
argue, "As applied to me, this felon ban is unconstitutional." Courts have
sometimes been willing to at least hear those arguments. They have been
sometimes successful, more often not. But the North Carolina Supreme
Court adopted exactly the position I just told you, which is the guy from

7. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).

2018]

HELLER IN THE LOWER COURTS

407

1971 with the marijuana conviction; they said, "No, you cannot, thirty
years later, or forty years later, prohibit him from possessing arms."
There are questions about things that are not on the list but are
arguably analogous to it. The Court said "convicted felons," but what
about someone who's been convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor?
Or what about a person dishonorably discharged from the United States
military-another category of persons who have a lifetime gun prohibition
by federal statute. Most courts say that, "There's no longstanding history
in tradition of gun bans for those kind of people, so we will take that to the
next stage, and go into step two, and analyze the ban on them under some
form of heightened scrutiny."
Heightened scrutiny, by definition, means you're not doing rational
basis. But there are a variety of types of heightened scrutiny. At the high
end, something, is just categorically invalid; that's what the Supreme Court
said in Heller: that a handgun ban, a ban on the most common arm that is
chosen by the American people for self-defense, is just void, end of
question.
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit, in Moore v. Madigan,' struck down the
most restrictive anti-carrying statute of any state in the country; the only
one that had no provision to allow citizens even to apply for a license to
carry a concealed handgun, or openly, for lawful protection. Illinois
prohibited anybody except police, security guards, and elected officials
from carrying. If you were an alderman, you could carry all over the
place-apparently your election being the appropriate background check.
So the courts have struck those down as categorically void, and that
has parallels. There are lots of other things in constitutional jurisprudence
where we have a categorical rule. For example, a permanent physical
trespass on someone's property, no matter how minor, is a taking, end of
question. If you're permanently on someone else's property, you've got a
takings issue; there's no balancing test or anything else. Or any law that is
based on animus against a particular religion is categorically void under the
First Amendment.
For lesser restrictions, as Ms. Shearer said, the courts typically go to
some form of means-ends balancing, of which the classic versions are strict
scrutiny, where there has to be a compelling government interest, and the
law has to be necessary to the interest; or the easier standard of
intermediate scrutiny, where you need an important government interest,
and the law has a substantial relation to advancing that interest. Both of
these tests have lots of varieties and subcategories.

8. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
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According to the lower court decisions, the questions about, How
tough are we going to be on the scrutiny? What standard do we apply?
depend on what the law is about. What's its scope? Does it apply to all
law-abiding citizens, or only to people who have already shown themselves
to be particularly dangerous? What type of restriction is it? Is it a
prohibition or is it a regulation? Where does it apply, in the home or in
public places? Does it affect the choice of arms that law-abiding citizens
have? And does it affect self-defense or the defense of others?
If strict scrutiny were never to apply, then the Second Amendment
would be treated as a second-class right, which McDonald v. Chicago says
you can't do, although some courts have done it anyway. Intermediate
scrutiny has been the most common type of scrutiny applied, often
appropriately, sometimes I would suggest not.
In normal intermediate scrutiny, one part of the test is, Is there a
substantially less restrictive alternative? That is, Could the government
achieve most of the aim while burdening substantially less of the right,
especially for people who are not abusing the right? That is a weaker test
than you have in strict scrutiny, where there must be no less restrictive
alternative. But the substantially less restrictive alternative issue in
intermediate scrutiny is still a meaningful test.
An example of the application of that was in a case called Heller III,
which was a challenge involving the District of Columbia's post-Heller
gun licensing system. The D.C. Circuit held unconstitutional the rule that
people who have registered arms in the district have to keep re-registering
them every three years. D.C.'s justification for this was, "Maybe the
person's become ineligible to possess arms, so when they re-register, we
can do another background check on them." And the D.C. Circuit pointed
out, "Well, you've already admitted, D.C. Government, that you can do
background checks on anybody at any time. You don't need this
registration trigger to do continuing background checks on registered
owners." So the D.C. Circuit found that continuing re-registration failed
the substantially less restrictive alternative test and was therefore void.
Or in the Tenth Circuit, in Bonidy v. Postal Service, the majority and
the minority both agreed, and both applied, the substantially less restrictive
alternative test, but they disagreed about the result.9 The majority said,
"It's okay to ban guns even in your car in a post office parking lot, because
the potential less restrictive alternative would be for the post office to give
people licenses to carry guns in post office parking lots. And that's just too
administratively burdensome, and difficult, and impossible for the postal

9. Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2015).
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service to do." The dissent did think that was a viable approach; they
agreed the test applied and disagreed just in its application.
As Ms. Shearer has also pointed out, some courts have used what has
been called "elevated intermediate scrutiny," or also, "not quite strict
scrutiny." That's the common approach of the Seventh Circuit, which they
started in a case called Ezell, where Chicago banned all firing ranges open
to the public within the jurisdiction.10 The court there said, "Well, firing
ranges, they're not quite at the core of the Second Amendment, because it's
not actual self-defense, but it's close enough because it's about how you
practice to use guns for self-defense. And so we will do 'not quite strict
scrutiny,"' or, as they later described it, as a form of "elevated intermediate
scrutiny."
They said, "Of course there are safety issues about firing ranges. You
don't want stray bullets or other things, but those can all be addressed by
having safety regulations instead of prohibitions, just like every other
jurisdiction in the country, including New York City, and Manhattan does.
You can have firing ranges that are open to the public and that operate in a
safe way by regulating them, which is less restrictive than prohibition."
There's also, finally, a particularly weak version of intermediate
scrutiny, which courts choose when they want to disfavor the right; they
ignore the substantially less restrictive alternative test. They admit that, by
definition, the burden of proof is on the government in any form of
heightened scrutiny. But in weak anti-rights intermediate scrutiny-as was
applied in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Cuomo,"
upholding the ban on so-called "assault weapons" and on standard size
magazines-the court said, "The burden of proof is on the government; it
has to come in with some substantial evidence. They've got to have some
real evidence here. Then once they do, the case is over. We're not
interested in whether the other side can rebut that evidence, and then if the
government's got a response to that. All we ask is the government make a
good showing to start with, and that's enough for the government to win,
end of case."
The only standard under which these kind of restrictions could be
upheld is that feeble and hostile reasoning. Even then, the law said, "You
can have a magazine up to ten rounds, but you can only load seven rounds
in it." The Second Circuit said, "That is ridiculous. The government effort
to prove that to be lawful falls far short. There's no point in telling lawabiding citizens they can only put seven of ten rounds in the gun because

10. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
11. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015).
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certainly criminals are going to put all ten rounds in. You should not put
law-abiding citizens at a disadvantage."
So intermediate scrutiny is malleable, as Justice Rehnquist said when
he was opposing the creation of that standard, but it's there, and it's what
we use sometimes-often applied properly, sometimes applied in a hostile
way by courts who are more interested in destroying than upholding the
right.
Thank you.
[APPLAUSE]
Henigan: Well, it's very nice to be with you this morning. You
know, Justice Thomas has been very disappointed at what the lower courts
have done following Heller. He has accused the lower courts a couple of
times of treating the Second Amendment as a second-class right. You
heard Dave Kopel use that term as well. And it is, in fact, true that Heller
has not proven to be much of a lethal legal weapon against gun control
laws as broad categories of those laws have been repeatedly upheldeverything from bans on gun possessions by felons, including non-violent
felons, bans on gun possession by domestic violence misdemeanants,
waiting periods, background checks, registration of guns, safety training
requirements, safe storage requirements, bans on-or licensing concealed
carry, et cetera, et cetera.
And obviously, that's very disappointing to Justice Thomas. It's
disappointing to Dave. It's disappointing to probably many in this room.
But my thesis is that this does not mean that the courts have relegated
Heller-the Heller Second Amendment--to a second-class right. Rather,
the lower courts have simply understood what should be obvious. By its
very nature, the Second Amendment is a different kind of right. It is, in
fact, our most dangerous right.
The exercise of the Heller right, which was described in Heller as "the
right to have a gun in the home for self-defense," increases the risk of harm
to those exercising the right, to their families, and to the community at
As a result, the Second Amendment is unique among our
large.
enumerated rights in its implications for public safety. The lower courts
have simply understood this, and they have crafted a jurisprudence that
accounts for it.
So let's talk for a moment about the Second Amendment as a uniquely
dangerous right. Those who exercise the right, of course, have no
assurance that a gun in the home will be used for the purpose of selfdefense, or for other salutary purposes. In fact, the research shows that for
every time a gun in the home is used in a self-defense shooting, there are
four unintentional shootings, often involving young children; seven

2018]

HELLER IN THE LOWER COURTS

411

criminal assaults, often involving domestic disputes where women are the
victims; and eleven attempted or completed suicides.
And given that we have long known that attacks with guns are far
more lethal than attacks with other weapons, it is not surprising that a gun
in the home increases the risk of homicide in the home by three-fold, and
the risk of suicide in the home by five-fold. And that increased risk from
the exercise of the Heller right is also borne by the community at large.
Residents of states with the highest rates of gun ownership are more than
two-and-a-half times more likely to be homicide victims than those in the
states with the lowest rates of gun ownership.
As one study concluded, "An increase in gun prevalence causes an
intensification of criminal violence, a shift towards greater lethality, and
hence greater harm to the community." So the more Americans who
decide to exercise their Second Amendment right, the more deadly violence
becomes. And certainly, any extension of the right beyond the home would
simply expose more people to the risk.
Now, it will be argued that the exercise of other constitutional rights,
particularly freedom of expression under the First Amendment, may create
a risk of violence or physical injury. But according to our First
Amendment jurisprudence, if that risk becomes sufficiently great, the
courts simply deny the protection of the First Amendment. Moreover, the
exercise of freedom of expression is simply unlikely to pose a serious risk
of physical harm, particularly lethal harm, and the same cannot be said for
the exercise of Second Amendment rights.
So the Second Amendment is unique in the risks created by its
exercise. It is our most dangerous right. But what's the legal significance
of this fact? Well, I believe it is misguided for courts to reflexively apply
to the Second Amendment the same constitutional standards and reasoning
developed in First Amendment cases. The unique nature of the Second
Amendment right demands its own unique jurisprudence. That's not to say
that First Amendment jurisprudence is irrelevant to the development of
Heller itself makes use of the First
Second Amendment doctrine.
Amendment in a number of different ways.
For example, as Heller observes, "Like most rights, the Second
But the development of Second
Amendment is not unlimited."
Amendment doctrine must recognize, on every issue, the unique
dangerousness of the Heller right and its unique implications for public
safety.
And I would contend that Heller itself recognizes the unique danger of
the right, and that is the real significance of the now-famous passage in
Heller, reiterated in the McDonald opinion, where the court limited the
scope of its own opinion. And you heard Hannah discuss this. Dave has
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discussed it. I'd like to actually quote the key passage. The court wrote,
"Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of
the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms."
Now, Dave mentioned that he thinks that these are exceptions that
prove some kind of rule, but it's not at all clear how broad that rule is
because the court added that, "these presumptively lawful regulatory
measures" are given "only as examples; [and this] list does not purport to
be exhaustive." And as Hannah noted, the court also indicated that
nineteenth-century court decisions upholding prohibitions on carrying
concealed weapons-that's not just licensing, that's prohibition-as well
as, the court noted, "the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of
'dangerous and unusual weapons.'"5
This passage represents an extraordinary effort by the Supreme Court
to go beyond the issue before it to communicate to the lower courts that the
application of the Second Amendment to gun laws must recognize the
unique public safety concerns inherent to the exercise of the right. Just as
the Heller court found that the right to be armed in the home for selfdefense is rooted in our history, so it also found that laws regulating that
right in the interest of public safety are also rooted in our history.
But the nature of these restrictions in Heller do suggest limits on an
analogy to First Amendment jurisprudence. For example, the First
Amendment would not tolerate a prohibition of freedom of expression by
felons or the mentally ill, yet these restrictions on gun possession by such
groups were seen in Heller as presumptively valid. So I think it's the
unique dangerousness of the Second Amendment right that accounts for
this remarkable passage in Heller.
Well, how have the lower courts applied Heller, particularly that
passage limiting the scope of the Heller decision itself? Well, as you've
already heard, the lower courts have reached a virtual consensus on the
analytical framework in Second Amendment cases, and it's described as a
two-step inquiry. The first being that the courts must determine whether
the challenged law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment
based on the historical understanding of the scope of the right. And if
conduct by the statute is unprotected, then the inquiry ends there; the law is
upheld without further review. The second step being that if the statute
does burden conduct within the right, as historically understood, then the
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court must determine the appropriate level of scrutiny and subject the law
to that level of scrutiny.
So let's talk about that first step for a moment. The lower courts may
have been influenced by First Amendment doctrine in this two-step inquiry,
but I think the first step was derived from Heller's reference to historical
analysis, listing those longstanding gun restrictions not called into question
by the decision. Now, some lower courts have implemented this first step
by determining that Heller's presumptively lawful regulatory measures are
simply categorical exclusions from the scope of the right. Others have held
that these longstanding restrictions are simply presumed to be valid.
And generally, lower courts have had some difficulty applying this
first step, and I think for two reasons. One, some of the restrictions listed
in Heller don't date back to the founding era, which raises the question
about just how longstanding restrictions must be in order to qualify. And
second, as has been noted, the courts have had to address gun restrictions
not specifically mentioned in Heller, and it's difficult to determine, often,
whether those restrictions have a sufficiently rich history so as to be
constitutional without further inquiry. And this has led the lower courts to
pursue frequently futile searches for historical answers on these particular
kinds of restrictions. And so they often throw up their hands and assume
that the restrictions at issue affect protected conduct and then just move on
to step two.
But it's clear that, to the extent that step-one analysis has been
important, it has been to impose categorical limitations on the scope of the
right. So I would cite as examples, the Ninth Circuit en banc decision in
the Peruta case, finding that there is no right under Heller to carry
concealed weapons;1 2 and the Fourth Circuit decision in the Kolbe caseanother en banc decision-finding that assault weapons and high-capacity
magazines are wholly unprotected by the Second Amendment.13
Lower courts have not adopted the view that history and tradition
alone should determine the constitutionality of gun restrictions; that is, they
have not determined that a restriction must be longstanding in order to be
constitutional. Although that has been the view adopted by some federal
circuit court judges-Judge Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit comes to
mind-but the consensus view is, if the restriction does burden conduct
within the scope of the right as traditionally understood, courts should then
proceed to the second step and evaluate the law under the appropriate level
of scrutiny.

12. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom.
Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017).
13. Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017).
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So let's talk about the second step. In determining the level of
scrutiny and applying it to specific laws, I think the lower courts have, with
few exceptions, recognized either explicitly or implicitly that the Second
Amendment is fundamentally different than our other enumerated rights.
In contrast to First Amendment jurisprudence-which has applied strict
scrutiny to broad categories of laws restricting speech, including laws
restricting the content of speech-the circuit courts in Second Amendment
cases have not applied strict scrutiny to gun regulations. Instead, as you
have heard, they have applied a version of intermediate scrutiny, which
requires a showing that the challenged law is substantially related to the
achievement of an important governmental interest.
Now, in applying intermediate scrutiny, several consistent themes
emerge from the circuit court opinions. First of all, that the prevention of
gun violence is an important governmental interest; that seems to be rather
well-accepted. Second, that the fit between the challenged regulation and
the government interest need only be reasonable, not perfect; a contrast to
strict scrutiny, as Dave explained.
Third, that the law must be supported only by evidence "reasonably
believed to be relevant to the problem addressed." And that is language
taken from the Jackson case in the Ninth Circuit, which upheld a local safestorage law and a ban on hollow-point ammunition.14 The courts have
basically said, "The law can be upheld, even if the evidence is conflicting."
And finally, that the court should give substantial deference to the
predictive judgments of legislative bodies because they are better equipped
than the judiciary to make the sensitive public policy judgments that are
really inherent in the gun control issue.
So generally speaking, lower courts have applied intermediate
scrutiny in a manner that is highly deferential to legislative judgments.
And some opinions have made explicit the distinction between the Second
Amendment and other constitutional guarantees. Let me quote from the
Tenth Circuit decision in the Bonidy v. US. Postal Service case, which
upheld the regulations prohibiting guns on postal service property. The
court wrote, "The risk inherent in firearms and other weapons distinguishes
the Second Amendment right from other fundamental rights that have been
held to be evaluated under a strict scrutiny test, such as the right to marry
and the right to be free from viewpoint discrimination, which can be
exercised without creating a direct risk to others."
So, in effect, the lower courts have moved very close to the standard
employed for decades by state courts, applying state right to bear arms
provisions, where those provisions clearly guaranteed individual rights
14. Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014).
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divorced from the militia. There's a rich history of state court adjudication
of right to bear arms provisions. And those state courts universally rejected
strict scrutiny, instead invoking a highly deferential, reasonable regulation
standard.
So if history is important here, this history of state adjudication of
right to bear arms cases should reinforce the deferential treatment of gun
laws being given by the federal courts. But the question can be raised: Is
this highly deferential level of scrutiny consistent with Heller, or is it
precisely the "interest balancing" that Justice Breyer advocated in his
Heller dissent, and that was clearly rejected by the Heller majority.
Well, I believe that Heller's rejection of interest balancing should not
be read as an instruction to lower courts to disavow any consideration of
the government's public safety interest in Second Amendment cases. After
all, Heller addressed a D.C. law that the court regarded not as a regulation
of the right, but as the destruction of the right. The court defined the right
as, "the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of
hearth and home." And the D.C. law banned possession of a weapon
which the court regarded as-and these are Justice Scalia's words-"the
quintessential self-defense weapon," that is, the handgun. That's what
Justice Scalia thought, and there's a wonderful passage in Heller where he
waxes poetic about the self-defense utility of handguns, providing the
possibility of actually calling 911 while you're holding the gun on the bad
guy. You may remember that passage.
So by virtue of the court's definition of the right, and the breadth of
the D.C. law itself, the Heller court was simply saying that the enumeration
of the right itself precludes any argument that the government's interest can
be so substantial to justify nullification of the right. In fact, the Heller
majority itself indicated that it did not regard Justice Breyer as proposing
any of the traditional levels of scrutiny for Second Amendment cases. And
nothing in Heller suggests that the regulation of guns should be subject to
strict scrutiny. The court did not adopt strict scrutiny for the D.C. law,
even though the Heller plaintiffs urged it to do so. And the court's listing
of a broad range of presumptively lawful gun restrictions is, I believe, itself
inconsistent with strict scrutiny.
Though most federal courts have applied this highly deferential form
of intermediate scrutiny, I must acknowledge the outlier court here, which I
believe is the D.C. Circuit. For example, in the Heller III case that Dave
discussed, the court purported to be applying intermediate scrutiny, but I
must say that decision reads like a markup of legislation in a legislative
body, with the court picking and choosing provisions of the D.C. law that it
liked or didn't like; even striking down a provision that would simply
require D.C. gun owners to know something about D.C. gun laws. So I

416

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2

would say it's not the kind of intermediate scrutiny that other courts have
used. It certainly doesn't reflect much deference.
And also, the court's decision in Wrenn v. District of Columbia last
year in which the court struck down, in a two-to-one vote, the D.C.
requirement that concealed weapon licenses be issued only to gun owners
showing good reason for guns in public; that is, some special self-defense
need by that person.15 In that case, the court extended the Heller right
beyond the home, and then it defined that right in such a way-and the
right it defined was, the "right to carry a gun in the face of ordinary selfdefense needs"-that the good reason requirement inherently nullified the
right, similar to what Heller itself had done.
So, as in Heller, the court struck down the law as a nullification of the
right without having to adopt a particular standard of review. Though the
court did not adopt strict scrutiny in the Wrenn case, in extending the
Heller right outside the home and striking down the good-cause
requirement, there is little indication of any deference to legislative
decision-making. But Wrenn was the only decision to strike down a
concealed weapon licensing requirement. So it is an outlier in many ways.
But at this point in the development of Second Amendment
jurisprudence, that case is an outlier, but either explicitly or implicitly, the
lower courts have generally recognized that the Second Amendment, as
defined in Heller, is our most dangerous right, and have crafted a
jurisprudence to reflect that fact. And perhaps the single most eloquent
recognition of the unique nature of the Heller right, and the real-world
consequences of failing to understand its uniqueness comes from J. Harvie
Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit, who was actually my con law professor at
the University of Virginia Law School.
He wrote in a 2011 opinion refusing to extend Heller outside the
home, these words: "This is serious business. We do not wish to be even
minutely responsible for some unspeakably tragic act of mayhem because
in the peace of our judicial chambers we miscalculated as to Second
Amendment rights." 16 And it is precisely this inherent risk of unspeakably
tragic acts of mayhem that has compelled the lower courts to treat the
Second Amendment not as a second-class right, but rather, as our most
dangerous right.
Thank you.
[APPLAUSE]

15. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
16. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011).
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Denning: Thank you. I wanted to thank Dean Leonard, and Spencer,
and the rest of the law review staff-excuse me-Professor Wallace and
Professor Ludington for moderating. And I want to thank my distinguished
panelists and the other guests, many of whom are sort of-could be
considered Second Amendment OGs. [LAUGHTER] We've been at this
for a long time. In fact, last night at dinner, Glenn Reynolds mentioned
that he first got interested in the Second Amendment when he did an article
on the right to keep and bear arms under the Tennessee Constitution, and it
just so happens that I was his research assistant for that article, which dates
both of us.
Well, I'm going to step back, for my part, this morning. We've been
sort of looking at a bunch of trees, and I want to draw back a little bit and
look at the forest. And what I want to do is discuss the Second
Amendment as, "ordinary constitutional law," which is a phrase that Glenn
used in an article that he and I wrote when Heller was decided. Heller and
McDonald, where the court recognizes the core right, and then incorporates
it, and applies it to state and local governments, was the sort of
breakthrough that broke the trench warfare between the individual rights
camp and the collective rights camp that had dominated the debate for
many, many years.
Now we're talking about how Heller should be read; how it should be
applied in a lower court. But what do I mean by "ordinary constitutional
law?"
I mean, we're watching the development of constitutional
doctrine-of the law of the Second Amendment. So you have the Supreme
Court opinions. We're talking about standards of review, what Bob Nagel
called "The Formulaic Constitution," right? Many of you who either had
or are in constitutional law know that there's all this memorization of
tests-three-part tests, balancing tests-that really make up the warp and
woof of constitutional law. And you get the sense that in constitutional
law, once decisions are made, the evolution of doctrine proceeds in a kind
of common law manner.
We don't resort to first principles every time we have a constitutional
question arise. Mostly it's particularly when you have competing lines of
doctrine that the argument turns on, "Well, which of these two lines is this
particular case more like?" But even to say that is incomplete, because I
think it's fair to say that there's different kinds of constitutional law, or
different kinds of constitutional doctrine. You have tests, like strict
scrutiny, that are less deferential. You have various forms of rational basis
tests, which are more deferential. And then sort of floating there in
between, hovering, you've got intermediate scrutiny, which I think the
panelists had pointed out, could be more or less deferential, depending on
who's putting what thumb on which side of the scale. And then you have
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various forms of just outright interest balancing, something that looks more
like the proportionality doctrines that are so popular with other
constitutional courts around the world.
But you'll notice something funny about even standards of reviewthis is a great frustration to my students and probably to you, too. Even
within standards of review that purport to travel by the same label, you see
instances in which courts, or the court, applies them differently. For
example, strict scrutiny in the analysis of racial preferences in government
contracting looks very different from the strict scrutiny of race-based
preferences in higher education and very different from strict scrutiny of
Also, rational basis of, "ordinary
content-based speech regulations.
economic and social regulation," under the Due Process Clause, looks very
different than the rational basis that the court has applied to cases like
USDA v. Moreno1" or in Lawrence v. Texas.18
Now, I'll get back to the question of why there are these inter- and
intra-doctrinal differences, and that is, in and of itself, an interesting
question, and I'll come back to it. But let me spin this out a little more. I
think that you could be able to-it's a little reductive, but it will work-I
think that you could map various constitutional law doctrines on two axes,
with the x-axis being more or less deferential. And then the y-axis-I hope
I have those directions going right-less frequency with which the court
will hear those types of cases and more frequency. And I think you could
pick out various places. There are plenty of doctrines where the court
employs less deferential tests, but they don't hear very many of those cases.
Likewise, you could have a more deferential application of various tests
that the court hears with some regularity.
Further, and with all respect to Alan Gura, I think that there is a much
more subtle interplay between the Supreme Court and the lower courts.
The standard account is that the court issues its decision and those
decisions are dutifully implemented by the lower courts. However, the
lower courts have tremendous amount of discretion in applying Supreme
Court precedent, especially where the court leaves open a number of
important questions that the lower courts eventually have to face.
I think this discretion increases, or at least becomes more salient, as
the rate at which the Supreme Court grants certiorari continues to decline.
I think the court is at an all-time low in the number of full-dressed opinions
that it issues each term, while the number of petitions for certiorari has
remained the same over the last several years, at about 10,000. The court's
full-dress opinions have dwindled to below 75. I think it may have been 70
17. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
18. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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last year. And you can see this discretion in how it affects the evolution of
doctrine in these post-Heller cases. So the law of the Second Amendment
is largely being left to the lower courts with infrequent, you might even say
nonexistent, review by the court.
So keeping all this in mind, then I come back to the question, "Well,
what kind of constitutional law is Second Amendment doctrine?" And
with a nod to my sometime co-author and Campbell Law Professor Mike
Kent, I'm going to argue that it most resembles the Takings Clause. Now,
if you remember anything about the Takings Clause, you know that the
Takings Clause covers a broad variety of takings. As Dave mentioned,
physical occupation-or its effective equivalent-is a taking, and the
government has to compensate you no matter how minor or how even
temporary the actual physical occupation is.
But of course, there are many ways to skin a cat. Government could
simply not physically seize property, but effectively seize it by subjecting it
to onerous regulations. So the court developed-to prevent easy evasion of
that physical evasion rule-the doctrine of regulatory takings;
acknowledging that there is some point at which government regulation of
private property becomes the effective equivalent of a physical taking. But
the court has been sort of circumspect in making sure that this doesn't go
too far.
So, basically, regulatory takings will be held to be the physical
equivalent of takings, and thus requiring the provision of just compensation
mainly in two categorical instances. One, where the regulation has
basically destroyed the value of your property. Right? This is a Lucas
case.' 9 A guy buys some islands in South Carolina, wants to develop them,
the state legislature says, "No development." Well, now he's got some
islands that you can't do anything on. Certainly, you can't develop it, and
put condos on it, whatever. And the court said, "Yeah, in that case, you've
got to compensate that owner."
In addition, unfair conditional takings. So you want to develop your
property in some way. The government says, "Fine, but you need to donate
a bunch of your other land somewhere else so we can make a park." And
these are the Nollan 0 and Dolan" cases. And the court says, "You've got
to demonstrate that there is a nexus between the condition and the request
for development, and then there has to be some kind of proportionality." In
other words, the condition can't-they can't say, "Well, donate property

19. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
20. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
21. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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worth a million dollars," when what you want to do is extend a driveway or
something.
Most other regulatory takings are subject to what's called "Penn
Central balancing." And there are a number of factors-investment-backed
expectations, public good-it's just a whole variety of factors that just get
weighed. And the way the factors are listed, and they're weighted-it's
more deferential, less categorical, more solicitous of public needs and
plaintiffs-those are difficult to win, in other words. And again, to avoid
evasion, the courts recently recognized that the judicial branch, too, could
affect a taking under certain circumstances.
I think it's fair to say that after some real enthusiasm among Takings
Clause enthusiasts, like Richard Epstein, that Lucas, and Nollan, and Dolan
heralded new possibilities for using the Takings Clause to affect a much
broader deregulatory jurisprudence. The court and the lower courts have
never gone as far as those enthusiasts have wanted. But the court has been
careful to prevent outright evasion of the Takings Clause by creating these
regulatory takings doctrines.
These are an example of something that Mike Kent and I have written
about, that we call "anti-evasion doctrines," that are sort of transsubstantive. They go across various doctrines, and they're developed to
prevent governments from paying lip service to a constitutional rule and
then circumventing it. So what you end up with in the Takings Clause is a
modest restriction on the worst abuses of regulation of and attempts to
regulate private property, in the name of the public good, and make private
property owners internalize those costs when the benefits are spread out
over a community.
So why do I say that the Second Amendment is very much like the
Takings Clause? I think there are some interesting parallels here. The
Supreme Court says that bans on private possessions of guns for selfdefense in the home are unconstitutional. The court then came back, in the
Caetano case, and slapped down an attempt by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court to basically nullify Heller outright, or close to it, by adopting
the kind of obtuse position that, "Well, weapons that weren't known at the
time the Second Amendment was ratified aren't protected, so therefore stun
guns aren't protected."
And I'm being a little unfair in the characterization of that holding,
but essentially, if you read the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's
opinion, you get the sense that they were basically daring the Supreme
Court to reverse them. Which it did, because the Supreme Court really
doesn't like to let lower courts get away with outright resistance.
The lower courts, moreover, for their part, have generally developed
their own anti-evasion doctrines to prevent evasion or frustration outright
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of Heller's core purpose. For example, Dave mentioned the Ezell case. So,
the Seventh Circuit says, "Come on, Chicago. You can't require people to
train with the weapons that they possess so that they know how to handle
them and then remove the opportunity to do so by banning all gun ranges
within the city. That's just not going to work. We know you don't like
Heller. We get it. But you don't have the choice of just creating
conditions that make it impossible for people to lawfully possess weapons
under your regulatory regime."
Bans on ammunition-I actually think that certain types of onerous
taxes on the purchase of firearms and the purchase of ammunition might
similarly trigger a kind of anti-evasion response by lower courts.
But having said that, I think that lower courts have tended to read
Heller narrowly. I think with the exception of Moore v. Madigan, that
Seventh Circuit opinion written by Judge Posner, where he struck down
Illinois's ban on public carrying. I think Posner was being deliberately
provocative himself. I think that he, who is a vociferous critic of Heller,
really just excoriates the decision, and its author, for that matter.
And I think Judge Posner was sort of being what two Columbia Law
professors have called "uncivilly obedient." [LAUGHTER] I think that he
was-much like the aggravated taxpayer who attempts to pay their taxes in
pennies, or the drivers who, in 1992, protested the 55-mile-an-hour speed
limit by driving exactly 55 miles an hour during rush hour-I think Judge
Posner was doing that. And I think there are other examples where courts
do this to try to bait the Supreme Court into granting cert in either adopting
their expansive reading or trimming their sails.
So the Supreme Court, having recognized the right and incorporated
it, has withdrawn into the clouds and is content to let the lower courts
monitor things. Well, what does this signal? Well, I argue that the choice
of a less deferential standard, relatively speaking, and the disinclination of
the Supreme Court to supervise the lower courts' administration and
evolution of the doctrine by not granting cert in cases and known events of
outright resistance means that the court is making a kind of inchoate, rough
judgment-that the standard review being employed is sufficient to guard
against egregious abuses. In general, I think that the court's approval and
the lower courts' adoption of this more deferential standard of review
means that the court itself is content that the political safeguards-the
political safeguards for the Second Amendment's core principle-are
sufficiently robust to prevent egregious abuses and do not warrant judicial
intervention. And the judicial branch, of course, can't do everything. It
needs to have some mechanism by which to triage cases. And I think this
is where doctrine comes in, and this is where less deferential and more
deferential choices-what those kinds of things signal.
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While the Supreme Court has not tolerated outright resistance to its
decision, it seems content to permit the continued percolation in the lower
courts and seems content that the Courts of Appeals have been alert to, and
quick to stymie, blatant or subtle evasion of Heller's core holding. Now,
whether this is salutary, whether this is the proper function of the court, is a
separate question. But I think it is-since doctrine as we know it has sort
of evolved-it's actually fairly recent. It dates only to, really, the early to
mid-1960s. So we're really only talking about standards of review that are
fifty years old.
And I think that that has been the role that the court has settled intochoosing standards based on its assessment of risk to constitutional
principle, and whether the risk is such that the political safeguards can't be
trusted to police abuses, and thus requires judicial intervention. And I
think right now the court isn't in the position where-well, as it is with
rational basis-we assume that if these laws affect enough people that, if
they get really abusive, political process will take care of it.
Nor are they at the point where they say, "The risk to constitutional
principle is so serious that we need to constantly monitor the actions of
political branches and be ready to step in and intervene." I think they're
somewhere in between. And again, whether this is normatively a good
thing is a separate question, but descriptively, I would argue that's maybe
some of what's going on. And that's why I say the Second Amendment
looks to me very much like, doctrinally, on the course of where the Takings
Clause has ended up.
Thank you.
[APPLAUSE]
Ludington: All right. Thanks, everybody. Thanks to our panelists.
So, panelists, I have a question for you to begin with. I would love to hear
the rest of the panel comment or respond to Dennis's assertion that the
Second Amendment is a uniquely dangerous right and therefore cannot be
treated, say, in the same terms as a First Amendment right, which ceases at
the level of violence.
Sure. This takes me back to the 1990s when, if you'd been
Kopel:
around then, you could have heard Dennis and me on various talk radio
shows and things like that, arguing about this. I think he's partly right, but
for the wrong reasons. This litany of statistics he showed are partly junk
science, and partly a failure to disaggregate law-abiding, normal people
from others. I would agree that in the home of someone who's got a long
record of violence, alcoholism, spousal abuse, that you put a gun in that
guy's hands, the data are unmistakable that you substantially increase the
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risk that someone else in the home is going to get shot. And he's also got
his arguments about why self-defense hardly ever happens, and things like
that.
I think it's a weak premise for him to base his theory on because
suppose we have an empirical debate on a different panel and suppose he
doesn't prevail in that debate? Does that then mean the courts should
change their approach to Second Amendment jurisprudence?
I think the easier point for his theory, which, by the way, he's very
good at what he does. He was in McDonald v. Chicago, which was about
incorporating the Second Amendment to make it apply to the states.
Everybody else on the pro-gun-control side was filing these briefs which
were as it turned out, an exercise in futility of saying, "Oh, no, don't
incorporate the Second Amendment. Yeah, you incorporate just about
everything else, but don't do this." They ran up against history, where
Congress clearly intended to incorporate the Second Amendment in
enacting the Fourteenth Amendment.
Dennis, instead of going down that useless road, filed a brief in
support of neither party, and argued for-as he did here, to say, "I'm not
saying incorporate it or don't, but make sure to say that the standard of
review should be on the lower end in general." The court did not adopt
that. Justice Breyer thought it was wonderful and talked about that kind of
thing in his dissent. We've seen, sort of a hyper version of Justice
Jackson's Steel Seizure Case's concurrence22 being treated as if it were the
opinion of the Court. The Breyer dissents have filtered down and been de
facto adopted by some lower courts.
Instead of saying, "Guns are bad. You're more likely to shoot your
wife because she burned the chicken than you are to ever defend your home
against an invader," the simpler thing is, guns are different. Arms are
different from speech. You can kill people with speech. Hitler did, and the
Holocaust started with words. However, the cause and effect is a lot tighter
and shorter with deadly weapons.
I think it is permissible to say that you have different rules for that.
For example, we would never say that when you get out of prison for
having committed fraud-a word offense-that you're thereby prohibited
from speaking, or after you've been convicted of criminal libel. People
don't lose their rights of speech, but people do, at least for a period, I think
properly, have restrictions after a conviction on ownership of a deadly
weapon. It's likewise why I think it's not unconstitutional to require
permits to carry deadly weapons in public, as long as there's a fair
licensing process that reasonable people can go through.
22. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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So I guess I think he's right in a way, but it's not on the junk science
statistics and sort of the Bloomberg line that, "Oh, if you own a gun, you're
stupid, because you're too incompetent to do that. If you need to shoot a
criminal, call the government, and they'll send someone over who can do it
for you five minutes later after you've already been killed."
[LAUGHTER] The social science data are not the point. It's that it's just
the nature of arms themselves that support having stricter rules for the
exercise of that right compared to the right of free speech.
Shearer: I have a response to that. So I don't agree that it's just
junk science. You know, these are all published studies. They're relied on
by legislatures. They make sense to a lot of people. It's not coming out of
nowhere.
And I just point out that earlier in our discussion of intermediate
scrutiny, it was pointed out that there are some courts that are applying a
version of intermediate scrutiny that isn't rigorous enough because they're
being deferential to the legislature. And I actually think that that makes a
whole lot of sense when we're talking about gun laws because there often
are empirical debates over the evidence.
There are competing studies, and they're both-it's hard to say that
one of them is a junk study and the other one isn't. It's two different
perspectives being presented, and I think that usually in intermediate
scrutiny analysis-this is how it works oftentimes in the First Amendment
context. I'm thinking of cases involving zoning disputes over First
Amendment protected businesses. In those instances, courts recognize
there can be competing evidence, but that's kind of a legislative judgment.
And it's for the legislature to weigh the different evidence, and so long as
that they're reasonably relying on evidence that hasn't been completely,
definitively debunked, that that is a legislative judgment.
And so, especially here when it's competing evidence over something
that affects people's lives and people's safety, in that case, the intermediate
scrutiny analysis is working exactly as it should.
Denning: I'd just like to make a point that the Supreme Court is very
inconsistent about how it treats conflicting evidence. In cases involving
abortion, in cases involving free speech-I'm thinking of the California
video games case the court has actually rejected; 23 has said, "We do not
rely on legislative judgments where there's conflicting scientific evidence.
Rather we should look to findings of fact by the district court." And so
which view the court should adopt, we could debate that. But I think it's
23. Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
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fair to point out that the court and lower courts are quite inconsistent when
they talk about when you have conflicting scientific studies and what is
deferential.
As to the question about the most dangerous right, I think it's an
extraordinary right and one that is not quite unique in the world. There are
a couple of other countries that recognize a right to keep and bear arms. I
mean, think about what it means. It represents a particular view of the
relationship of the individual to the state, wherein the individual does not
rely on the state, and the individual does not cede to the state a monopoly
on instruments of violence. And that is a very different view of the
relationship with the individual and the state that is at work in the rest of
the Western world.
Henigan: First of all, on the question of my citing junk science, all of
the studies I cited were peer-reviewed studies, published in major journals.
And I suspect there'd be a lot more of them, except that the gun lobby has
done a very, very effective job of shutting down continued research on gun
violence. These studies were actually so threatening to the gun lobby that
they went to Congress and got appropriations riders attached to bills saying
that CDC and NIH could not fund these kinds of studies in the future. So
this is all part of the gun lobby's master strategy of choking off academic
research on guns. Nevertheless, the studies still exist. They're peerreviewed. I don't think they've been effectively refuted.
But I did not mean to suggest that in order to recognize the Heller
right as the most dangerous right, you need to agree with the particular
studies or particular statistics, although I was saying that those statistics do
support that proposition. I think it's simply obvious, and it has been
obvious to the lower courts, that guns aren't like books at all. And that is
precisely what led the Heller court to explain that this long tradition of
individual right to be armed has been accompanied by an equally long
tradition of regulation of the right, which recognized its dangerousness.
Also, I would point out that, yes, it may be true that the introduction
of a gun in certain homes increases the risk more than in other homes, but it
is awfully difficult to figure out the differences between good guys and bad
guys. A tenet of the NRA's ideology has always been that it's very easy to
do that, and you just make sure that the good guys have the guns, and the
bad guys don't. But of course, every bad guy was at once a good guy, in
the sense that they had not yet committed their first crime, and so it's very
difficult to do this.
So generally speaking, introducing guns into the home for self-defense
increase the risk in those homes, some more than others, and increases the
risk to society at large. And yes, the Holocaust came about in part because
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of an ideology, well-articulated by a madman, but I believe there were arms
involved in enforcing the Holocaust.
Ludington: There's been a question from the audience. They were
hoping you might comment a little more specifically on the way that the
lower federal courts have relied on state court jurisprudence, and whether
there is actually an alignment between those two strands of law, or whether
the federal courts are significantly more supportive of restrictive gun laws.
Denning: What you have to realize-I alluded to this a few minutes
ago, this business of tiered scrutiny-strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny,
rational-basis scrutiny, is very recent. It simply didn't exist in the
nineteenth century. The job of the courts in the nineteenth century was
more one of boundary tracing, and the boundary was between reasonable
and unreasonable regulations of property, of rights, of whatever. But those
were more conclusions than they were modes of analysis.
So I think it compares apples to oranges to say, "Well, there was a
reasonableness standard in the nineteenth century, in these right to keep
and bear arms cases." That's true, but that was the only game in town.
They didn't have a choice. There was no strict-scrutiny tradition to draw
on. The choices were binary. These were either constitutional or
unconstitutional, and they didn't have the doctrinal apparatus that courts
have today.
And whether something that looks more like that
reasonableness standard is something that ought to be adopted is a separate
question, but I just point that out as a descriptive matter.
Henigan: I think it's interesting that the Supreme Court in Heller and
the lower federal courts have not made much reference to this long
tradition of state court adjudication, because this is a tradition of state court
adjudication of rights to bear arms provisions that were always regarded as
guaranteeing individual rights, in most states, not connected to the militia.
So we have this rich jurisprudence that has not been drawn on, and I think
it's odd. There would have been no necessary reason for the lower courts
to begin to look at these tiers of scrutiny, but they have. They've borrowed
much more from the First Amendment in that way than from state court
adjudication of right to bear arms cases.
It is interesting that the state courts have continued to decide these
cases to the present time, and they've continued to invoke this reasonable
regulation standard. They did not jump at First Amendment case law and
say, "Oh, now we should really start looking at this at a higher level of
scrutiny," at all. They could have done that, but they have not done that.
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And yet here you have the federal courts who have not at all looked at
the state courts for any kind of guidance, so it's peculiar. But I do believe
that that rich history of state court adjudication should be drawn on by the
federal courts. And before Heller and McDonald, the gun lobby would file
lawsuits under these state provisions against local and state gun laws. We
were involved a great number of them as amicus, supporting the
government, and these reasonable regulation standards were not toothless.
There was some risk that we might lose. It wasn't the equivalent of
rational basis review. But that standard makes a lot more sense than doing
this historical inquiry into whether this is protected conduct and then
invoking all these tiers of scrutiny.
Kopel:
We all agree that the state courts' decisions have not been
very big in post-Heller jurisprudence. My coauthor and I read every
federal circuit court decision, including the unpublished ones, post-Heller,
on the Second Amendment and found the state precedents are surprisingly
small. Except for occasionally, say, on history of the right to carry, they'll
go back and look at nineteenth-century cases, but you don't see a lot of it.
One reason is there is a fundamental structural difference. Under the
U.S. Constitution, once you get any issue into heightened scrutiny, then the
burden of proof is on the government to prove that the law is constitutional.
How tough that burden is can vary, but the burden of proof is absolutely on
the government. In Colorado and in many other state courts, the standard
on constitutional challenges, amazingly, shockingly, and improperly, but
well-established, is that the plaintiff has the burden of proving the law
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. As if infringements on your
civil liberties get the same protection as does someone whom the state is
trying to execute. I think that's wrong, but that is a very big difference
between a lot of state constitutional jurisprudence and U.S. Constitution
jurisprudence. That's one of the major barriers that makes it difficult for
courts applying the U.S. Constitution to draw on these state precedents.
Shearer: I'll just add that it goes the other way as well, particularly
in some states that don't have a very old right to bear arms provision. I
worked on a case recently in Delaware. Delaware's Supreme Court has
interpreted its state right to bear arms as actually being broader than the
Second Amendment. And in this case, the court ended up striking down
Delaware's prohibition on guns in state parks. And although the court had
interpreted its state right to bear arms as being broader than the Second
Amendment, the opinion really heavily drew on Second Amendment
jurisprudence in the area of public carry. So it's influencing state courts in
the other direction as well.
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Ludington: Panelists, I was wondering if you could comment a bit
more on how courts have used history, particularly in terms of determining
whether a restriction is longstanding. Is history the only way to determine
that? Or are there any other criteria that the courts can draw on?
Henigan: Well, I'll just comment that it is not at all clear what lower
courts are supposed to do under step one; what "longstanding" means. It
has sent the lower courts down serious historical rabbit holes trying to
figure out the history of particular kinds of arms provisions. One of the
problems I have with step one is that it is yet another invitation to lawyers
to do history, and it was lawyers doing history that led to the mistakes in
Heller in the first place. Because, as I articulated last night, I think the
Heller court got the history terribly wrong, and the vast majority of
historians would agree with that proposition.
So the invitation to these courts and lawyers to do this historical
analysis is [LAUGHSI an invitation to folly. And I think that's why a lot
of lower courts have kind of thrown up their hands and said, "Well, we're
not sure. Let's go to step two." And that's where the deference comes in,
and that's where they have upheld the vast majority of gun laws. But the
fact of the matter is, step one seems to have been used only to limit the
scope of the right, so from the point of view of someone who wants
deferential review, that's not such a bad thing. At least the lower courts
have not gone in the direction of Judge Kavanaugh, which would be to say
that history is the only determinant and you shouldn't look at governmental
interests at all.
To follow up, there are only a few cases where the
Kopel:
government has won by saying, "Oh, this is a longstanding"-convincing
the court this is a longstanding regulation when it wasn't something in the
specific Heller list. They prevailed on that argument for handgun
registration in the D.C. Circuit, and for restrictions on gun possession by
The latter had more of a genuine
juveniles in the First Circuit.
longstanding history, in some states dating back to before the Civil War. L
As Dennis said, it's hard to tell exactly how long does "longstanding"
have to be. And of course, laws that have been repealed, and that were
seen as too restrictive, they may have been "long," but they're no longer
"standing," [LAUGHTER] so they wouldn't count. So I think, as he says,
most courts are reluctant to give the government a win on the longstanding
theory at step one and instead will proceed to step two and test the law
under heightened scrutiny.
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Denning: One other thing to note is that Scalia's list of what Glenn
and I have called "the Heller safe harbor"- not even many things in those
lists were particularly longstanding. [LAUGHS] Okay? It's not clear
where he got them, other than-there's a theory that most of them check
off prohibited persons under federal law, and he wanted to make sure that it
was a signal to lower courts, to like, "Look, you know, be cool. Don't go
crazy, okay? "We'll-something you're striking down, we'll eventually
get around to doing it."
And also, incidentally, the Supreme Court was very much listening.
One of the reasons they didn't adopt an explicit standard of review is, if
you recall the history of the litigation, the U.S. government intervened-the
Bush Administration intervened. And Paul Clement filed a brief that
basically said, "Hey, you know, we're really worried if you adopt strict
scrutiny that a ban on machine guns would stand. And so, please don't do
that. Whatever you do, don't do that." And I think that probably shaped
both the absence of an explicit standard of review and this sort of Heller
safe harbor that, again, the language got repeated in McDonald.
But it's not clear where he got those or what timeframe he was
referring to when he referred to them as "longstanding."
Ludington: Staying on the topic of scrutiny for a minute, I was
struck by the sort of slogan that to use intermediate scrutiny turns the
Second Amendment right into a second-class right because there certainly
are other important rights. Perhaps I'm thinking of rights to be free of
gender bias that are where the Supreme Court employs an intermediate
level of scrutiny.
Kopel:
I don't think intermediate scrutiny is per se making it a
second-class right. It all depends. In the First Amendment, some things
are tested under strict scrutiny, and time, place, and manner things get
tested under what is now known as "intermediate scrutiny." It's the
question of what things get tested under it. I would suggest that gun bans
ought to be strict scrutiny at least, if not categorically prohibited, but it's
also the form of strict scrutiny.
We talked about the zoning cases, which is exactly the precedent, with
the Alameda Books case, where the Supreme Court set out the standard of
review.24 This was intermediate scrutiny, and it was zoning time, place,
and manner. So the government has its justification for this zoning law, a
First Amendment restriction, says the court. So we think, "Does the
government have good enough evidence for it so far?" Okay, well, maybe
24. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
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then it looks like the government's going to win, but then the Supreme
Court says, "The other side gets to put in its evidence, and they may
undermine the evidence that the government put in. Then if so, you've got
to go back and see whatever the government has to counter that." The back
and forth of normal fact-finding is not treating the First Amendment as a
second-class right, and when you apply that in a Second Amendment case,
that's just treating it fairly.
What is treating it as a second-class right is what the Second Circuit
did, which is, you can do a gun ban, and let's make sure the government
has some good evidence for it, and then we're done. And they even cited
the Alameda case, but it happens to be exactly the opposite of what they
did, because Alameda says, "Look at the evidence on both sides," and the
Second Circuit's methodology was, "No. We look at the evidence on one
side, and if it's good enough, then we're done."
Denning: One other thing, just to point out, there's intermediate
scrutiny, and there's intermediate scrutiny. I mean, the point about intradoctrinal variety-gender classifications are a perfect example. So the
version of intermediate scrutiny that the court employs there, particularly in
recent cases, is nearly indistinguishable from strict scrutiny.
And on the other hand, the intermediate scrutiny in some of the
Second Amendment cases and some of the other cases looks as deferential
as rational basis; it looks awfully deferential. Certainly, it looks-let me
put it this way, it looks less deferential than, say, the court's application of
intermediate scrutiny to regulations of commercial speech.

